trigger point at 50 percent of the total voting rights of OCEAN. But he failed to comply with the rules specified by the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning Tender Offer. Later on January 7, 2015
exceed trigger point at 25 percent of the total voting rights of TPP. But he failed to comply with the rules specified by the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning Tender Offer. Later on March 6
result, he aggregate shareholding exceeded trigger point at 25 percent of the total voting rights of KC. But he failed to make a tender offer for all KC securities within the period specified by the
significantly higher than the market price, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of all MAKRO shares at the same price. He obtained the material non- public information by virtue of his
higher than the market price, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of all MAKRO shares at the same price. He obtained the material non- public information by virtue of his positions
indirectly by SHV, at 787 baht per share significantly higher than the market price, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of all MAKRO shares at the same price. He obtained the material non
issued ordinary shares sold of MAKRO then held directly and indirectly by SHV, at 787 baht per share significantly higher than the market price, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of
market price, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of all MAKRO shares at the same price. SEC Act S.241 in conjunction with Section 86 of the Penal Code Settlement Committee Meeting
, thus requiring CPALL make a tender offer for acquisition of all MAKRO shares at the same price. SEC Act S.241 in conjunction with Section 86 of the Penal Code Settlement Committee Meeting No. 10/2015
offerors failed to comply with rules specified by the Capital Market Supervisory Board by virtue of Section 247 of the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535 as they did not deliver the offer document (“Form